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Hegel and the Western Spirit
Ricardo Duchesne
rduchesn@unb.ca
This paper argues that Hegel’s Phenomenology of Spirit ([1806] 1977) should be read as
an invaluable work on the distinctive restlessness of Western culture – so long as we
view this book as an account of the developmental experience of the Western spirit
rather than of the human spirit as such. The basic truth contained in Hegel’s
Phenomenology is that the West is the only civilization in which “freedom” and
“reason” have progressed over the course of history. The distinctiveness of the Western
spirit is that it cannot be comprehended as a substance, a state of being, as in other
civilizations, but should be apprehended as an “activity”. The rational-liberal culture of
the West can be known only by knowing it as an experience that developed in time.
Like Weber, Hegel detected an inner necessity (a “dialectical” logic) in the
philosophical development of the West. The difference is that Hegel traced this logic to
the nature of human reason per se to become actually what it was potentially from the
beginning. From the first flowerings of philosophy in ancient Greece, Hegel portrayed
this rational spirit as if it were in a state of dissatisfaction and alienation, ceaselessly
pressing ahead, trying to understand, overcome, and sublimate every nonconceptualized unknown it encountered. He believed that reason started to display this
restless disposition – its true nature – when it came to “discover” itself as a faculty in its
own right in ancient times. For it was then that reason for the first time apprehended its
capacity for self-reflection, to think for-itself, in terms of its own volitional abilities,
ceasing to accept passively the existence of norms, gods, and natural things as if they
were “things-in-themselves” beyond its own reflective judgments.
Unlike Weber, Hegel did not restrict the experience of Western reason to the
rationalizing activities of formal and theoretical reason; he was less preoccupied with
the way reason had subjected social life to quantification, precision, and standardization.
What drew Hegel’s attention was the seemingly restless desire of Western reason to
become fully conscious of itself as free activity. It was this desire to be the source of its
own assumptions and principles that drove Western reason forward until it brought into
existence a culture wherein individuals enjoyed freedom of inquiry, tolerance of diverse
views, and meritocratic advancement. According to Hegel, individuals become what
they are potentially – rationally self-conscious agents – when they recognized
themselves as free in their institutions and laws.
The Phenomenology is a work that seeks to capture, in a comprehensive manner, the
developmental experience of the idea of freedom in its intrinsic association with the
developmental experience of reason. It does so by viewing every single major Western
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outlook – for example, Roman stoicism, skepticism, Catholic scholasticism, Cartesian
rationalism, British empiricism, German idealism, and romanticism – not as isolated or
timeless viewpoints but as evolving “moments” in the effort of human reason to become
what it is intrinsically: the free author of its own concepts, values, and practices. The
Phenomenology thus exhibits the ways in which diverse but interrelated outlooks held
sway and conviction for some time only to be seen as limited in their inability to provide
answers consistent with the demands of beings that are becoming more aware of
themselves as the free creators of their own beliefs, laws, and institutions.
The Phenomenology is thus an account of the entire dialectic of theses, anti-theses, and
syntheses effected throughout history until Hegel’s own time. Hegel believed that
humanity had reached in his own time (in the post-French Revolution era of Europe) a
point of true and full satisfaction as far as the conceptualization of the human capacity
for free reflection was concerned. This is why Hegel wrote that Spirit “appears in time
just so long as” humans have not achieved a proper self-understanding of themselves as
free rational beings; Spirit would continue to evolve in time. Hegel’s point was not that
there would be no more history after him (no new philosophical outlooks or no further
debates about, for example, how widely free speech should be extended). It was that,
insofar as the conceptualization of human reason and freedom was concerned – as well
as the capacity of the modern liberal democratic state to provide the framework for the
expression of one’s freedom – the final stage of history had been reached during his
time.
This paper argues that Hegel’s historical philosophy should be read as an account of the
intellectual developmental experience of the West rather than of humanity. Hegel wrote
in his Philosophy of History that the first phase of the idea of freedom was to be found
in Asia:
In the political life of the east we find a realized rational freedom developing
itself without advancing subjective freedom…The glory of Oriental conception
is the One individual as that substantial being to which all belongs, so that no
other individual has a separate existence, or mirrors himself in his subjective
freedom (1956: 105).
But what Hegel saw thereafter in China and India was mere “duration,
stability…ahistorical history.”
[While the states and empires in the East] are constantly changing their position
towards each other…are in ceaseless conflict, which brings on rapid
destruction…This history is, for the most part, really unhistorical, for it is only
the repetition of the same majestic ruin (1956: 106).
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The rest of the history of freedom would take place only in the West, starting with the
Greeks and Romans, through the Christians and the Reformation, to the Enlightenment
and the French Revolution.
What explanation did Hegel offer to account for this Western peculiarity? It is rather
difficult to decide because, while Hegel was clearly writing about the historical
experience of Western reason, he also believed that reason was a human generic faculty.
He wrote that “mankind in-itself is rational,” and that the nature of this rational being is
to become aware of its own conceptual creations and activities. This is why Hegel was
confident with the “possibility of equal rights for all people,” and the possibility that the
modern Western conception of freedom would be extended to all the cultures of the
world (Pinkard 2000: 493).
Yet, Hegel also wrote of European culture as if it alone had been uniquely characterized,
as Pinkard notes, by “a fundamental ‘negativity’ about itself, a kind of permanent selfdoubt and self-questioning that constituted its peculiar energy and driving force” (2000:
471). But Pinkard does not tell us why Hegel saw this negativity in Europe alone. He
writes that Hegel presented his account of the development of the “Idea” of freedom, in
the Phenomenology, as if it had been “rationally necessitated by the internal
deficiencies of earlier articulations of the Idea” (2000: 491).
This way of reading the Phenomenology is in tandem with a long line of Hegel scholars
who have interpreted this book as a portrayal of the maturation of human consciousness
as such. While Hegel scholars are aware that the Phenomenology is an account of the
historical experience of Western consciousness, and know well enough that this book
makes historical allusions to this culture only, to Western historical texts, philosophers,
and personalities, they still interpret this book and his philosophy as if it were an
exposition of “human experience and cognition” (Harris: viii, his italics).
My view is that we can make sense of the seemingly necessary way in which reason
actualizes what it is possibly in itself – a rational spirit capable of self-determination and
self-legislation – only if we conceive the Phenomenology as an intellectual account of
the experience of the Western mind, since only this mind has exhibited an intense desire
to subject the world to its own ends. It is mainly the Western self that has been unable to
feel “at home” in the world until it got rid “of the semblance of being burdened with
something alien” (Hegel cited in Stern 2002: 42).
Why this has been so? How do we explain the determination by which the Western
mind has sought to overcome, for example, the naturally-given reality of things by
comprehending the laws of nature and by creating successively new technologies and
new strategies of survival and expansion? Why has the Western mind shown less
reluctance to accept “the ineffable mystery of the world”? Why have Westerners been
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less willing to accept a social order based on laws and norms which have not been
subjected to free reflection?
I believe that Hegel did pose these questions in particular reference to Europe: why the
history of this continent came to be such that it could be seen, retrospectively, as “a
gradation – a series of increasingly adequate expressions or manifestations of freedom”
(1956: 63). He did so in a section of his Philosophy of History entitled “Geographical
Basis of History,” and in a section of his Philosophy of Mind entitled “Anthropology of
the Soul.”
Hegel and the Geographical Basis of the “infinite thirst” of the West
His explanation, bluntly expressed, is that the geography of Europe engendered a
different human “soul,” “character,” or “personality”. The cultures of China, India,
Persia, the Americas, and Europe evolved in dramatically different geographical
settings. These different settings deeply affected the character or psyche of its people.
Hegel is not a materialist-geographical determinist. The role geography plays in his
work is fundamentally different from the role it plays, for example, in Jared Diamond.
In Diamond, humans are reactive creatures who adapt to the pressures of the
environment as they seek to survive; there is no essential difference between humans
and animals, both species are fundamentally driven by a common desire to survive.
Diamond explains divergent outcomes amongst different human communities in terms
of divergent resources and geographical locations. For him, the external environment is
the active agent of historical differentiation and change. In Hegel, by contrast, different
environments have different effects on the psychology of humans and the opportunities
available for the exercise of their faculties. Some environments encourage some
“character” traits more than others. Different environments may thus work to activate, to
a higher or lesser degree, certain innate dispositions and potentialities of the human
species.
There is, however, an interesting similarity between Diamond and Hegel in the way both
call attention to geographical differences in conscious opposition to racial differences.
The peoples of the world belong to the same species, but their state of being – their
mental vision, temperament, and character – is deeply influenced by their place of
habitation in the earth. The first general observation Hegel makes is that “the locality of
world-historical peoples” are confined to the temperate climatic zone; “in the extreme
zones man cannot come to free movement; cold and heat are here too powerful to allow
Spirit to build up a world for itself” (1956: 80).
He notes that the three continents of the Old World have “an essential relation to each
other, and constitute a totality” in contrast to the peoples of the other continents which
have been comparatively isolated (87). This relation lies around a single sea, the
Mediterranean, which is the “true theatre of history”; without this sea “the history of the
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world could not be conceived: it would be like ancient Rome or Athens without the
forum, where all life of the city came together” (87).
India, China, and Mesopotamia, with their river plains, were major players at the outset
of human history, but due to certain geographical barriers they remained relatively
enclosed within themselves, with the sea having less influence on their culture (101).
Meanwhile, Europe, among the Mediterranean regions, opened up the area beyond the
Alps to start a new epoch in human history encompassing the Atlantic (88).
For Hegel, the “character” of Europeans was fundamentally molded by the sea. The sea
was not merely an economic opportunity, an invitation to commerce; it was an intense
stimulant to the human soul and mind:
The sea gives us the idea of the indefinite, the unlimited, and infinite; and in
feeling his own infinite in that Infinite, man is stimulated and emboldened to
stretch beyond the limited (90).
The sea cultivated a distinct sense of the known and the unknown, the finite and the
infinite, and a curiosity about the limits beyond the known. The experience of a lifestyle in the sea produced less restrained personalities. But there is more to the geography
of the place we call “Europe.”
Hegel notes, as well, the greater environmental diversity of Europe and the fact that its
mountains, plains, valleys and streams are all “of limited extent” and no one great river
or plain dominates the ecology. He contrast this variety to the Eastern states, wherein
the “prominence” of “single massive features” – deserts cut off by major rivers – give
the landscape a “monotony” lacking in the stimulation of the senses and the mind's eye.
In the West, the horizon was “diversified,” in the East, the horizon exhibited “one
unvarying form” (90, 225).
In Uniqueness of Western Civilization, I add to Hegel that one other distinctive
geographical attribute of Europe was the so-called “Middle European Corridor leading
from the Atlantic to the Black Sea,” and eastwards through the Pontic steppe across the
Volga and the Urals. This corridor and its link to the steppes, with its pastoral, horseriding way of life, was a crucial geographical component in the formation of Europe’s
uniquely restless culture.
Hegel and the Beginnings of Western Reason
To this day no one knows how to account for the origins of the “Greek miracle.” In stark
contrast to the numerous explanations which have been offered on all the other major
revolutionary transformations of Europe, no strong or consensual argument has yet been
produced in response to why ancient Greece “discovered the mind,” discovered the
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method of causal science, invented the literary form of tragedy, prose writing, and
tapped into the progressive spirit of critical reason. Many classicists have offered no
more than tautological explanations in which the explanandum reappears in the
explanans: “Greek philosophy grew out of an exclusive national culture and is the
legitimate offspring of the Greek spirit” (Windelband 1956: 3); “Greek philosophy has a
good claim to be regarded as the most original and influential achievement of the Greek
genius” (Luce 1992: 9).
One influential but rather question-begging explanation is that Ionia, the birth place of
Greek natural philosophy, located in coastal areas of present-day Turkey, was dotted by
mercantile city-states that looked favorably upon innovation, criticism and individual
expression. The worlds of Assyria, Babylonia, Persia, and Phoenicia, however, were
similarly cosmopolitan, urbane, and commercial. Some have added that a community of
rational inquiry was made possible by the emergence in Ionia, and in Greece at large, of
a unique institution, the polis. It has been argued that the polis, by being a free political
institution in which all male citizens were free to participate in the affairs of their city,
promoted a culture characterized by reasoned discourse and debate, adversarial
viewpoints, and a disposition for seeking out the truth on rational grounds.
But why did Ionia-Greece see the rise of a freely-organized political community in the
first place – and not the more advanced civilizations of the Near East, or, for that matter,
the Sumerian city states which dominated the Mesopotamian landscape around 2500
BC? Collins answers in passing that the “Greeks retained the crude democracy of tribal
war coalitions” in their city-states (6). The problem here is that all civilized cultures and
cities came originally from tribal backgrounds and tribal “democracies.” Was there
anything unique to the tribal organization of the Greek city-states?
McClellan and Dorn have tried an explanation that points to the geographical
distinctiveness of Greece. They argue that the mountainous ecology of Greece, which
compartmentalized the land into separate valleys, encouraged the rise of small
independent city-states. They also contrast Greece’s rainfall farming to the great rivers
and large flood plains of the East. They observe that the former promoted decentralized
economic activities whereas the latter promoted hydraulic agriculture and monarchical
administrations (1999: 55-59).
The incompleteness of this explanation is that it presumes that the “competitiveness”
evoked by the presence of hundreds of city-states produced, on its own, a republican
government of citizen-soldiers. It presumes as well that the mere existence of
independent city-states and citizen-soldiers cultivated an ethos of free discourse and “a
new sort of science” devoted to the pursuit of “theoretical knowledge”. McClellan and
Dorn are seemingly aware that something is missing in their explanation, concluding: “it
may be impossible to reach an understanding of exactly why a new scientific culture
came into being in the unique habitat of Hellas” (57).
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What Hegel suggests to me, albeit in a very general way, is that there were already in
Greece – before the polis – characters unwilling to submit to despotic rule. There is no
space here to explain what I mean by these characters. Suffice it to say now that the
polis was created by a pre-existing aristocratic culture whose values were physical
prowess, courage, fierce protection of one’s family, friends, and property, and above all,
one’s personal honor and reputation. The polis grew out of a peculiar social landscape
of tribal republics in which individual rivalry for prestige and victory had the highest
value, and in which hatred of monarchical government was the norm. Before citizenship
was expanded to include independent farmers and hoplite soldiers, the Greek mainland
was dominated by a warrior aristocracy. This expansive and aggressive aristocracy was
the original persona of Western civilization.
What I have highlighted from Hegel is certainly inadequate. I have tried to suggest that
Hegel’s “inner dialectical necessity” makes more sense if we see it as an account of a
peculiarly restless mind. Most of the dialectical steps in this book are brought forth by
human beings who have already “discovered the mind” and have started to reason
beyond the pre-reflective customs and habits of their community through a dialectical
style of reasoning. We find this form of reflection earliest in the Milesians. The
Milesians are the fathers of rational thought, the “first men self-consciously to
subordinate assertion to argument and dogma to logic” (Barnes 1982: 5). With the onset
of Ionian philosophy, what had been hitherto “only a possibility” – the use of reason in a
self-conscious way – “begins to manifest itself in the conduct of the World’s affairs”
(Hegel 1956: 57, my italics).
Hegel on the “desire” of World-Historical Individuals
In Hegel there is another major insight which takes us back in time to the earliest
manifestations of Western freedom – before the rise of the polis, before the first
expression of Western reason in Ionia. This insight became clear to me after I
approached Hegel’s historical philosophy for what it says about Western culture in
particular rather than for what it says about humans in general. While Hegel wrote of
reason as if it was driven by an inner necessity to make the world its own, he accepted
Kant’s idea that human passion, ambition, and egoism were the handmaids of reason.
The actual social advancement of reason was not a matter of the “inner necessity” of
reasoning alone, of “thought thinking itself”. Humans were not ethereal minds cut off
from the elements of life; they were creatures of nature with instincts, desires, and
interests.
We must be careful, however. There are two different contexts in which Hegel writes of
the role of human desire: First, in reference to actual historical/political actors, as he
does in his Philosophy of History and, second, in the context of section “B. SelfConsciousness” in the Phenomenology which contains the famous dialectic of the
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master/slave relationship. When Hegel writes of desires in his philosophy of history he
is thinking of both the everyday passions of ordinary humans and the extraordinary
passions of great individuals. This argument is squarely in line with Kant’s reasoning
whereby the march of humans to higher levels of culture results from their “unsocial
sociability.” Hegel agrees that without qualities of an unsocial kind, out of which the
spiritual and physical tortures of world history have arisen, all the potentialities of
humans would have remained hidden in their germ. Hegel, however, came up with his
own term, “the cunning of reason,” to refer to the fact that human beings, in pursuing
their private aims, were not always fully conscious of the temporal possibilities of
history and of the way their own actions participated in the furtherance of those
possibilities.
Hegel, however, made an interesting distinction, if implicit, in the way the “cunning of
reason” utilizes the ordinary desires of average humans, and the way it utilizes the
extraordinary passions of “world-historical individuals” (1978: 36, 40). The cunning of
reason we observe on a daily basis, so to speak, consists in the way that reason employs
the desires of normal individuals to sustain the ongoing state of affairs. But the cunning
of reason that is associated with the passions of “world-historical individuals” such as
Alexander the Great, Julius Caesar, and Napoleon, is altogether different in the way it
brings about new stages in the development of freedom. Only heroic individuals have
passions powerful enough to break the bonds of the old order. Mere desires for wealth
and security are hardly their driving passions. They want to achieve immortality even at
the price of bodily discomfort, happiness, and premature death (1978:41). Thus, in this
sense, Hegel makes a distinction between appetitive desires and status-seeking desires.
Although “world historical individuals” are “practical and political men” with no
philosophical grasp of the movement of reason in history, Hegel is quite clear that, “at
the same time they are thinkers with insight into what is needed and timely.” Thus,
Napoleon was driven by his lust for conquest while simultaneously bringing to the
nations he conquered the new ideals of the Enlightenment that France had realized in the
Revolution of 1789. Many of the countries he invaded were indeed compelled to
liberalize their laws, abolish serfdom, improve and extend education. The tragedy is that
thousands of soldiers and innocent people, whole cultures and institutions, were
ruthlessly destroyed in order to bring about a new stage of freedom.
It was, indeed, world-historical individuals, with their excessive pride and willfulness,
who have done the most to push forward new ideals, challenging political orders where
ordinary human passions tended to fall asleep, reawakening again and again the
commoners to pit themselves against each other in the name of new principles, violating
old religions moralities, looking for new lands, and transgressing the boundaries of the
unknown. But what do these “world historical individuals” have to do with my claim
that Hegel’s insights into the nature of human desire take us back in time to the most
primitive manifestations of Western freedom before the rise of the polis?
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The Master-Slave Dialectic and its Historical Reference
This brings me to the second context in which Hegel uses the word “desire”: in Section
B, “Self-Consciousness” of the Phenomenology (1977), Chapter 4 entitled “The Truth of
Self-Certainty,” which contains the famous account of “Lordship and Bondage.” Today,
the most common interpretation of the lordship and bondage section (or the master-slave
struggle) is that it is a parable about the nature of “selfhood” in which Hegel sets out to
demonstrate that self-consciousness becomes determinate only through communication
with another self- consciousness. Hegel sets out to show that true recognition depends
on a relation of mutual equality in which there are neither masters nor slaves (Rockmore
1997: 64-72).
The master-slave dialectic, it is true, is intended to illustrate that one “cannot achieve
self- certainty except as a member of a community of free persons who mutually
recognize one another’s rights” (Wood 1990: 93). This dialectic ends with the image of
a master who cannot feel satisfaction from the recognition he gets from his servant. But
this relates to the eventual outcome. We should not underestimate the dynamic which
precedes the creation of master-slave relationship. The opening paragraphs of Hegel’s
master-slave dialectic describe two combatants engaging in a life-and-death struggle for
the sake of “pure prestige.”
Thus, in its very origins, before there is any master and slave, we have a confrontation
between two independent individuals, each of whom is driven to fight the other because
each desires to wrest superior recognition from another self. The desire of the
combatants is not for reciprocal appreciation. The concluding outcome is a relation of
mutual recognition, but in the beginning we are dealing with two self-assertive
individuals for whom the other is an object that needs to be subordinated.
I would argue, furthermore, that this initial struggle can be read as Hegel’s version of
the “state of nature” parable first presented by Hobbes and Locke. My reading here is
indebted to Alexandre Kojeve’s much discussed, but not well understood, lectures on
Hegel, which he gave in Paris during the years 1933-1939. Kojeve does not state
explicitly that this fight is a description of the state of nature, but he does write as if it
had an empirical or anthropological basis in the past before the formation of states. I
will go beyond Kojeve, however, in suggesting that the life and death struggle that
brings about the master-slave relation should be read as a description of the Western
state of nature.
Kojeve offers a far more penetrating account of the role of desire in Hegel’s philosophy.
He does so by belaboring the point that self-consciousness makes its appearance in the
decision “of Man” to fight to the death for the sake of recognition. Kojeve explains that
“Man” starts to become “truly” self-conscious only to the extent that he “actively”
engages in a fight where he risks his life “for something that does not exist really” – that
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is, “solely ‘for glory’ or for the sake of his ‘vanity’ alone (which by this risk, ceases to
be ‘vain’ and becomes the specifically human value of honor” (1999: 226). I have
learned from Kojeve (and I agree that this idea is not as definite in Hegel) that the
section on “Self-Consciousness” opens with this fight because it wants to show that
“Man” becomes self-conscious of “his humanity only by negating himself as animal,” in
his willingness to risk his life, and thus negate his biological fear of death, for the sake
of being esteemed by another human being (222-25). Kojeve also wants to show that it
is in the attitude of “being-for-self” or self-assertiveness (rather than in the attitude of
“being-for-another or deference) that man brings about a profound effect on the
constitution of the human personality, leading to discovery of a unified self – this is a
point I will explore further later.
The “very foundation” of the being of a human is not abstract contemplation, cognition
per se, but the desire for something. The desire for food is a biological desire, which is
satisfied by the action of eating. But if one is to realize one’s “I” as a distinctive “I” one
must not allow one’s “I” to be determined by the non-I which one desires. Desire is
human, and not merely animal, to the degree that one’s desire is “directed toward
another desire and an other Desire.” One acts in a human way when one’s desires are
not merely for the thing alone, but so as “to make another recognize [one’s] right to that
thing.” In the desire for other humans to recognize one’s desires one brings out one’s
human, non-biological “I”. It is at this point that one desires an immaterial, intentional,
and therefore uniquely human, object of desire.
Now, since there is a “multiplicity of desires,” the action that springs out from wanting
others to make one’s desire the desire of others will result in a fight in which each
desiring subject will want to subsume the other’s desires just for the sake of wresting
from the other the importance of one’s own desires. Only those humans who are willing
to risk their biological being for the sake of a non-biological recognition from others are
truly humans (Kojeve 1999: 5-8, 40-41).
For Kojeve, it is in the risking of one’s life that an individual first discovers or reaches a
consciousness of his human self, because it is through this act that man negates his
“objective-or-thingish mode-of-being,” showing that he is not bound by “any
determinate existence.” Kojeve interprets Hegel to be saying that in order to achieve
human self-consciousness, a man must be willing to put his life at risk; he must be
willing to fight to the death. He must be a willful, assertive character who has the
courage to affirm his “being-for-self” rather than to defer to another. This is why “Man”
is obligated to start wars, for it is only through action and the risk of life that
consciousness of oneself as an independent being that is not merely dominated by the
dictates of nature comes to light. In the willingness to fight it becomes clear that “Man”
is not a “given-thing,” does not exist “in a purely passive way, but is a being that creates
himself by conscious “Action.”
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One’s willingness to assert one’s “being-for-self” is the precondition for a life that is
freely willed by one’s own intentions and goals. It is the precondition for the
achievement of recognition by another consciousness and the first instance by which
humans achieve individual consciousness. The willful self must therefore “provoke” the
other; force him to start a fight with him (Ibid: 11-13). It is through actual fighting for
pure prestige that man first becomes self-conscious of his “freedom” by negating his
fear of death and acting according to his chosen ideals in-and-through a struggle with
another human.
What we witness in this dialectic is the first “authentic appearance of Freedom” (Ibid:
230). The master is the first historical character to freely create a specifically human
world by acting in the name of something as immaterial as “recognition”. All other
desires are acted upon to satisfy our biological urges, but the desire for recognition is the
only desire that is quintessentially immaterial and human. When humans strive for status
and prestige they are seeking the desire of another; they are craving for the other
person’s desire to be directed towards them.
In my book, The Uniqueness of Western Civilization, I argue that here was a uniquely
Western state of nature which can be illustrated (in detail) by reference to the prehistory
of Indo-European aristocratic berserkers, including “barbarian” Europeans. I elaborate
further on Kojeve’s interpretation of this dialectic, and question his argument (and by
implication Hegel’s) to argue, rather, that a battle for prestige does not logically entail as
its outcome a social relation in which one singular master (upon winning the fight)
imposes his authority over a servile man. It makes more sense to envision this battle as a
contest between two warriors each inhabiting a pre-historic aristocratic culture in which
the highest ideal of life was the attainment of recognition through the performance of
heroic deeds. It is consistent with the tenor of Hegel’s argument to revise his dialectic in
such a way that i) the fighting men are each seen as members of an aristocracy in which
the main ethos of life was the pursuit of prestige through the performance of great
deeds; and ii) the recognition sought by the fighters was from their peers and not from
the ones who were de facto enslaved.
I argue that the beginnings of self-consciousness presuppose the historical existence of
self-assertive characters living in a heroic culture. The unceasing aristocratic desire for
personal distinction was, in fact, the basis for the awakening of human selfconsciousness and the eventual formation of an integrated personality capable of
understanding the opposition between the “natural” and the “mental” world, leading to
the dialectic of Western reason and freedom, which Hegel captured in his
Phenomenology of the [Western] Spirit.
I also show in my book that the Indo-European speaking cultures that came to dominate
Europe in a unique way starting in the 4th millennium should be considered as
constituting the “beginning” of the West. Bronze Age Europe was a pre-state “social
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arrangement” dominated by warrior elites who were duty-bound to confirm the essential
reality of their status by displaying their prowess in deeds, by leading raids against
distant neighbors, acquiring booty, cattle, and women, and particularly by fighting in
single combat. The primordial roots of the West’s restlessness lay in the fearless
assertiveness of its founding aristocratic fathers.
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